Secret sharing is a protocol in which a "boss" wants to send a classical message secretly to two "subordinates," such that none of the subordinates is able to know the message alone, while they can find it if they cooperate. Quantum mechanics is known to allow for such a possibility. We analyze tolerable quantum bit error rates in such secret sharing protocols in the physically relevant case when the eavesdropping is local with respect to the two channels of information transfer from the boss to the two subordinates. We find that using entangled encoding states is advantageous to legitimate users of the protocol. We therefore find that entanglement is useful for secure quantum communication. We also find that bound entangled states with positive partial transpose are not useful as a local eavesdropping resource. Moreover, we provide a criterion for security in secret sharing-a parallel of the Csiszár-Körner criterion in single-receiver classical cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the role of entanglement has been studied extensively in many areas of science, ranging from quantum information ͓1͔ to many-body physics ͓2͔. Entanglement has been identified as the essential ingredient in quantum communication without a security aspect, e.g., in quantum dense coding and teleportation ͓3͔. We find that entanglement is also useful in secure quantum communication.
The quantum communication task that we investigate is known as secret sharing ͓4͔ ͑cf. ͓5͔͒. It is a communication scenario in which a sender Alice ͑A͒ wants to provide a ͑classical͒ message to two recipients ͑Bobs-B 1 , B 2 ͒ in a way that each of the Bobs individually knows nothing about the message, but they can recover its content once they cooperate. For transmitting a binary message string ͕a i ͖, Alice can then take a sequence of random bits ͕b 1,i ͖, send it to B 1 , and at the same time send a sequence ͕b 2,i ͖ = ͕a i b 1,i ͖ to B 2 , where denotes addition modulo 2. Thus a i = b 1,i b 2,i , assuring that the Bobs can recover the message if they cooperate, and yet none of them can learn anything on the message of Alice on his own, since the sequences ͕b 1,i ͖ and ͕b 2,i ͖ are random.
An important issue is of course security, i.e., distributing the message in a way that no third ͑actually fourth here͒ party learns about it. This can be achieved using quantum cryptography ͑e.g., by the Bennett-Brassard 1984 ͑BB84͒ scheme ͓6͔͒. Alice simply has to establish secret random keys, independently, with both Bobs, and use them as onetime pads to securely send bits in the way required by secret sharing. We call this the BB84 2 protocol. It has been argued ͓4͔ that a more natural way of using quantum states in secret sharing is to send entangled states to the Bobs and, as a result, avoid establishing random keys with each of the Bobs separately by combining the quantum and classical parts of secret sharing in a single protocol. We call the protocol in ͓4͔ as E4 ͑since it uses four entangled states͒.
In this paper, we consider security thresholds for both E4 and BB84 2 , i.e., the highest quantum bit error rates ͑R QBE 's͒ below which one-way distillation of secret key is possible. There are four main results obtained in the paper. First, we provide a criterion for security of secret sharing, for which the one-way classical distillation of secret key is possible between the sender and the receivers: the parallel of the Csiszár-Körner criterion in ͑single-receiver, classical͒ cryptography ͓7͔. Second, we find the optimal quantum eavesdropping attacks, on both E4 and BB84 2 , that are local. An attack which acts by local operations and classical communication ͑LOCC͒ on the particles sent through the two channels ͑A → B 1 and A → B 2 ͒ is physically the appropriate one in this distributed-receiver case. We show that the threshold R QBE for E4 is about 18.2% higher than that of BB84 2 for individual eavesdropping attacks without quantum memory. In cryptography with a single receiver, entanglement-based protocols are known to be equivalent, in principle, to protocols that employ quantum channels but do not require entanglement ͓6-9͔. We show that it is advantageous to use entanglement for a cryptographic task with two receivers. Entanglement is therefore found to be strictly more useful in a cryptographic scenario. Our results, apart from answering a basic question about the role of entanglement in communication tasks, have the potential of usefulness in the commercial use of quantum cryptographic systems. Third, we show that bound entangled states with positive partial transpose are not useful to the eavesdroppers in this LOCC eavesdropping scenario on secret sharing. Last, we provide an interesting general method for dealing with local eavesdropping. This paper is arranged as follows. In Sec. II, we explicitly state the secret sharing protocols using product encoding states and entangled ones. In Sec. III, we give the errorcorrection and privacy amplification schemes that are required in a scenario where there is a single sender but there are two receivers. Actually, the schemes carry over to the case of an arbitrary number of receivers. It turns out that there are significant differences in the error-correction scheme required in this distributed-receiver scenario as compared to the case of a single receiver. Section IV sets the stage ͑and notations͒ for finding the eavesdropping strategies on the secret sharing schemes considered. In particular, in Sec. IV B, we find the Csiszár-Körner criterion for the distributed-receiver scenario. Section IV C formulates the problem of finding the optimal R QBE , which is made more focused in Sec. V. The stage is finally ready for comparing the use of product states with that of entangled states for encoding in a secret sharing protocol ͑Sec. VI͒. The optimal LOCC eavesdropping attacks appear in Sec. VI A. The important issue of comparing the R QBE thresholds for a noisy transfer channel is taken up in Sec. VII. A summary is given in Sec. VIII.
II. PROTOCOLS
A secret sharing protocol can be characterized by
where j labels the different encoding "bases" used, ͉ j,a ͘ are two-qubit states sent by Alice to the Bobs if she uses basis j and wants to communicate the logical value a, while 1 j,k 2 j,k is a set of observables compatible with basis j ͑so that if the corresponding measurement is performed by the Bobs, it allows them to recover a proper logical bit of Alice͒. In practice, B 1 ͑B 2 ͒ randomly measures the observables 1 j,k ͑ 2 j,k ͒ ͑in the protocols that we consider, they will be one of the three Pauli matrices͒ on states received from Alice in each round. After the transmission is completed, the Bobs announce the observables they have used in each round to Alice, who, judging on whether this combination of observables is present in 1 j,k 2 j,k for the particular j she had used in that round, tells the Bobs whether to keep or reject their measured results for that round-the sifting phase.
The BB84 2 protocol is defined as
where ͉x Ϯ ͉͑͘y Ϯ ͒͘ are eigenstates of the Pauli x ͑ y ͒ matrix. The fact that there are two states corresponding to a given ͉ j,a ͘ simply means that each of them is sent randomly with probability 1/2. The E4 protocol ͓4͔ ͑see also ͓10͔͒, on the other hand, is defined as
where
͑2͒
and ͉0͘, ͉1͘ are eigenstates of the Pauli z operator.
After the sifting phase, let the bits of Alice and the Bobs, obtained in a given set of rounds, be described by the prob-
͑3͒
In order to decide which of these protocols is better suited for secret sharing purposes, we need to find out which one tolerates a higher R QBE , i.e., allows for a distillation of secure secret sharing key in the presence of a higher level of disturbance.
III. ERROR CORRECTION AND PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION

A. Error correction
Knowing R QBE , a one-way error correction is performed to correct all errors with arbitrarily high probability. In single-receiver cryptography, error correction can be performed from the sender to the receiver, or vice versa.
In secret sharing, there are two separated receivers, who cannot communicate ͑they could in principle not know about each other͒, and each of them individually has completely random bits. So there is no way for Alice to perform oneway error correction to Bobs-whatever she sends to each of them individually, it will not be enough for them to correct errors, unless she sends the total information, which is of course not the solution we are after.
The only remaining option is that each Bob sends some information to Alice, judging on which she is able to correct her bits ͕a i ͖ in a way that for every i : a i = b 1,i b 2,i . Fortunately, this is indeed possible by using random coding techniques ͓11͔.
Let each of the three parties have n bits after the sifting phase. Consider a random coding function
known to all three parties ͑and the rest of the world͒, where m Յ n will be chosen later. This function assigns a random m-bit codeword to each of the 2 n possible n-bit strings. Error correction goes as follows: B 1 calculates his m-bit codeword f͕͑b 1,i ͖͒, while B 2 calculates his m-bit codeword f͕͑b 2,i ͖͒. Then they send their respective m-bit codewords to Alice. Subsequent to this, Alice looks for all n-bit sequences
and chooses a pair ͕b 1,i Ј ͖, ͕b 2,i Ј ͖, for which the Hamming dis-
is minimal. It can be shown that for n → ϱ, this strategy is successful with arbitrarily high probability, provided that
is the binary entropy function, with p ͓0,1͔. This result is quite intuitive, since in a standard bipartite error correction, the length of a codeword has to fulfill m Ն nh͑R QBE ͒. ͑9͒
In secret sharing however, the two Bobs together have to provide Alice with
bits. These additional n bits are needed, since a sequence of one of Bobs taken separately is completely random for Alice.
As a result each of the Bobs has to send a code of length that satisfies Eq. ͑7͒.
B. Privacy amplification
After the error-correction stage is completed, Alice and the Bobs need to perform privacy amplification in order to obtain a possibly shortened but a completely secure key, on which an eavesdropper has no information. This presents no additional difficulty in secret sharing, as compared to bipartite cryptography, since its performance, in principle, requires no additional communication between Alice and the Bobs. It is enough that all parties apply the same hashing function ͓12͔ for shortening the key, and if there were no errors, in the sense that a i = b 1,i b 2,i , for all i, then there will be no errors in the shortened key. The only thing left to be determined before the privacy amplification is performed is the amount of information that an eavesdropper possesses by judging on the detected R QBE .
IV. LOCC ATTACKS
In our scenario of distributed receivers, the appropriate class of operations that the eavesdropper will be able to implement are LOCC with respect to the partition of the encoding states between B 1 and B 2 . It may be noted here that without the LOCC constraint, the security analyses of the E4 secret sharing protocol and the single-sender single-receiver BB84 cryptographic protocol are isomorphic, as both protocols make use of four nonorthogonal states with the same mutual scalar products.
In our security analyses, the eavesdropper ͑i͒ will perform only individual attacks and ͑ii͒ will not be allowed any kind of quantum memory. Restriction ͑i͒ means that an eavesdropper can interact, in a given round, with only the quantum state sent by Alice to Bobs in that round and is based on limitations of currently available technology. The justification of ͑ii͒ is also based on current technology limitations-no long lasting quantum memory has been developed so far.
A. Single-round probability distribution
To analyze eavesdropping attacks, consider the state ͉ j,a ͘ being sent from Alice to the Bobs. Collaborating eavesdroppers E 1 and E 2 , acting on channels connecting Alice with B 1 and Alice with B 2 , respectively, can perform an arbitrary quantum mechanically allowed LOCC operation E ͓trace-preserving ͑TP͒ completely positive ͑CP͒ LOCC map͔ to create a state
The operation is LOCC with respect to the partition B 1 , E 1 ͉ B 2 , E 2 . Subsequently, E 1 and E 2 perform an LOCC measurement on their subsystems in order to obtain information about the bit shared by Alice with the Bobs, while sending possibly perturbed subsystems B 1 and B 2 to their legitimate recipients. Without loosing generality, we can restrict this measurement to have only two possible outcomes ͑0 or 1͒, since only the value of a transmitted bit is of interest to the eavesdroppers. Hence we model the measurement by a two-element positive operator valued measurement ͑POVM͒ ͕⌸ E 1 E 2 ͑e͖͒, e =0,1. Obviously
but we additionally require that the measurements are LOCC based. After Alice and the Bobs have performed a sifting procedure and kept measurement results which were obtained in compatible bases, we can write the probability distribution p ABE ͑a , b , e͒, describing the distribution of bit values, a, of Alice, the logical bit, b = b 1 b 2 , of the Bobs, and the bit e obtained by an eavesdropper couple in the attack, as
where p͑j , a͒ is the probability that Alice sends the state ͉ j,a ͘ in a given round, whereas ͕⌸ B 1 B 2 ͑j , b͖͒ is a POVM corresponding to the measurement by the Bobs in the basis j ͑compatible with the state sent by Alice͒, where the sum of their individual measured values, modulo 2, equals b:
The POVMs used by the Bobs are already set by the corresponding secret sharing protocol used by Alice and the Bobs. Therefore the positivity and normalization conditions
are automatically satisfied. Moreover, the form of the POVMs chosen in the protocols also guarantees that they can be implemented by LOCC. We assume the convention that if one of the Bobs ͑lo-cally͒ performs a i measurement, characterized by a Pauli matrix, then he ascribes the bit value 0 or 1 when he projects on an eigenvector with eigenvalue −1 or 1, respectively. Notice that if in the tables defining the secret sharing protocols in Sec. II, there is an observable − y y , it simply means that one of the Bobs measures an observable − y , and hence he will associate the inverted bit values to measurements which result in projection on a given eigenstate. For example, in the BB84 2 protocol, for j = 1 and a = 0, we will have
while in the E4 protocol for j = 1 and a =0 ͑notice that we have two combinations of observables that are compatible with the state transmitted by Alice͒, we have
We introduce non-TP CP operations E 0 , E 1 :
, acting on the input and output Hilbert spaces of the Bobs, and defined as
where E e represents the disturbance experienced by a state transmitted to the Bobs once the eavesdroppers have obtained the value e. Note that even though each E e is not TP, E 0 + E 1 is-the latter corresponds to a situation when one averages over the results of the measurement of the eavesdroppers. Then,
͑18͒
It is now clear that the eavesdropping strategy is completely defined by specifying the two operations E 0 and E 1 and, for a given protocol, yields a joint probability distribution p ABE ͑a , b , e͒.
B. Security criterion
In single-receiver cryptography, if p ABE ͑a , b , e͒ describes the single-round bit values ͑a of the sender Alice, b of the receiver Bob, and e of an eavesdropper͒, after the eavesdropper attack and after the sifting stage is completed, the maximal one-way secret-key distillation rate K is given by the Csiszár-Körner criterion ͓7͔,
where I͑ : ͒ is the mutual information between the corresponding parties. Provided that K Ͼ 0, the one-way distillation of a secret key is possible. The result of a single round of a secret sharing protocol is the probability distribution p ABE ͑a , b , e͒, given by Eq. ͑18͒, describing the probabilities of bit values ͑a of Alice, b = b 1 b 2 of the Bobs, and e of the eavesdroppers͒. As we have discussed in Sec. III, the error-correction stage in secret sharing can only be performed from the Bobs ͑receivers͒ to Alice ͑sender͒. Therefore, using an analogous reasoning as in the original Csiszár-Körner criterion, one arrives at a formula for the maximal one-way secret-key distillation rate given by
In other words, the eavesdropper couple does not at all have to care about their mutual information I͑A : E͒ with Alice but only concentrate on obtaining as much information on the bit b obtained by the Bobs by causing the smallest possible disturbance. Provided that for a given R QBE , the optimal eavesdropping attack, i.e., the one minimizing K, yields K Ͼ 0, a secure "secret sharing key" can be distilled.
C. R QBE threshold
The R QBE threshold for a cryptographic protocol is the level of errors above which it is no longer possible for the legitimate parties to distil a secure key. Therefore, to calculate the R QBE threshold for secret sharing protocols, one should look for the highest value of R QBE , for which it is still possible to find eavesdropping LOCC operations E e , so that the resulting probability distribution p ABE enjoys the property I͑A : B͒ = I͑B : E͒.
Assuming a natural symmetry, namely, that Alice sends different logical values a with the same frequency, and the eavesdroppers perform a symmetric attack-i.e., does not favor any particular bit value-the reduced probability distributions p AB and p BE depend only on one free parameter. In the case of p AB , this is simply the R QBE . Consequently, the equality I͑A : B͒ = I͑B : E͒ is equivalent to the equality of the reduced probability distributions,
͑up to a freedom of inverting bits of some of the parties͒. This allows us to reformulate the task of finding the R QBE threshold to the following problem: find the maximal R QBE for which an eavesdropper can perform the LOCC attack, resulting in p AB = p BE .
V. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM AS A SEMIDEFINITE PROGRAM
Let us for a moment forget about the LOCC condition imposed on the attacks of the eavesdroppers. The problem of finding the R QBE threshold is then a semidefinite program. To see this, denote
and recall that by using the Jamiołkowski isomorphism ͓13͔, we can associate the completely positive maps E e with the positive semidefinite operators P E e L͑H out H in ͒ in the following manner:
͉i͘ ͉i͘ is an unnormalized maximally entangled state in the space H in H in and I is the identity operation on the second space H in . Hence our problem variables are entries of two 16ϫ 16 matrices, which are required to be positive semidefinite.
The trace-preservation condition of E 0 + E 1 translates to a condition on positive operators,
where the partial trace is performed over the H B 1 out H B 2 out space, while the identity on the right-hand side is acting on
in . This condition is obviously a linear constraint in the matrix elements of P E e . Similarly, p ABE is also linear, and hence the "insecurity condition" p AB = p BE is linear as well. Finally, the R QBE , which we want to maximize, is linear.
In order to deal with an LOCC constraint, we first impose the weaker "PPT constraint," positivity after partial transposition of the P E e operators-we transpose the subsystem
in . This is a strictly necessary condition for LOCC ͓14,15͔, and so in principle this assumption could lead to an optimal attack that is nonlocal ͑i.e., non-LOCC quantum attack͒. However, by explicit construction, we will show that the optimal PPT maps we obtain in the end are actually LOCC-this of course implies that these are the optimal LOCC attacks.
VI. ENTANGLED VERSUS PRODUCT ENCODING
We present here the solutions for maximal tolerable R QBE for BB84 2 and E4 protocols found by solving the semidefinite programs described in Sec. V by using the SEDUMI package. We denote the threshold R QBE 's of the BB84 2 and E4 secret sharing protocols as R QBE ͑BB84 2 ͒ and R QBE ͑E4͒, respectively. Although solving the semidefinite program provided us only with numerical solutions, we were able to recognize their simple analytical form, which agrees perfectly with numerical results. Hence, all the results we present will have an analytical form.
For the BB84 2 protocol, we have found that
The optimal operations E e
, and f = id. The optimal P E 1 E4 is the same as P E 0 E4, but with c replaced by −c. Again these optimal PPT maps will be proven below to be LOCC.
Interestingly
which indicates that indeed the protocol using entangled states is more secure ͑cf. ͓16͔͒.
A. Explicit LOCC forms of the optimal attacks
Usually the only way of showing that a given operation is LOCC is to give its explicit LOCC Kraus decomposition. Let us first analyze the optimal attack on the BB84 2 protocol.
First of all, the operations E e BB84 2 are separable, as they can be written in the form Notice that K e,2 does not depend on the index e ͑equivalently we could instead choose K e,1 not to depend on e͒, we will denote it simply as K 2 . The full operation
͑34͒
The above operation is indeed LOCC since it can be realized as follows. First an operation given by four Kraus operators K 2 1 , 2 is performed on the second subsystem, and the measurement result ͑ 1 , 2 ͒ is transmitted to the first subsystem.
For given values ͑ 1 , 2 ͒ received by the first subsystem, an operation using two Kraus operators K 0,1 1 , 2 , K Consider a situation in which the eavesdroppers E 1 and E 2 are allowed to possess an arbitrary amount of bound entangled states with positive partial transpose ͓14͔. This, in principle, is giving more power to the eavesdropping process, as such states cannot be prepared by LOCC.
However, the eavesdroppers will still be restricted to performing only operations that preserve the positivity of partial transpose. Therefore, the results of the preceding subsection show that for both the protocols considered, the optimal R QBE will still be reached by an LOCC operation.
C. Optimal secret-key rates below thresholds
Using a modified semidefinite program, i.e., imposing a given R QBE ͓which in our case is equivalent to fixing I͑A : B͔͒, and trying to maximize the mutual information I͑B : E͒ ͓which is possible using semidefinite programming, even though I͑B : E͒ is not linear in the problem variables, since a maximization of I͑B : E͒ is equivalent to minimizing the error probability between the bits of E and B, which is a linear quantity͔, we obtain the maximal secret-key rate as K = I͑A : B͒ − I͑B : E͒. In Fig. 1 we show the maximum achievable secret-key rates for the two protocols as a function of measured R QBE . It is clear that the E4 protocol is better not only because of its higher R QBE threshold but also because of its higher key rate for all R QBE .
VII. TYPICAL NOISE
Judging the usefulness of cryptographic protocols by comparing their R QBE thresholds may not a priori be sensible from an experimental point of view. This is because in an experiment, we face noise caused by natural factors, as well as by the eavesdropper͑s͒. Hence a relevant question is as follows: which protocol allows a secure key transmission in the presence of a higher level of noise, of the type present in an experiment?
Consider a typical situation when we send the two qubits ͑one being sent from Alice to B 1 and another from Alice to B 2 ͒ via two fibers. A usual model of noise here would be that each channel ͑fibers͒ is an isotropically depolarizing channel and that they are independent. Given a channel with a fixed level of depolarization, we ask the following: can we securely extract some secret key using either the E4 or the BB84 2 protocol? This may not be equivalent to comparing R QBE thresholds because different states are used in the two protocols, which under the same noise level may behave differently, and result in different R QBE 's. In particular it could happen that in such a situation it might be advantageous to apply a protocol with a lower R QBE threshold. Therefore, in principle, it could be that the R QBE ͑the one under a given noise model͒ for E4 is much higher than that for BB84 2 , and it may even be that the R QBE for E4 is higher than the threshold R QBE ͑E4͒ obtained before, while for BB84 2 , the R QBE , after the noise affects the sent states, is below the BB84 2 threshold. Then BB84 2 would be more advantageous than E4 in such a noisy environment. We would then use BB84 2 , and in this sense BB84 2 would be better than E4. However, for a depolarizing environment, the R QBE 's for E4 and BB84 2 depend in the same way on the depolarization parameter of the depolarizing channel. If an isotropically depolarizing qubit channel acts as for both the protocols. Comparing protocols using R QBE thresholds as a figure of merit is therefore legitimate here both from theoretical and practical points of view.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Entanglement is the essential ingredient of quantum communication in which there is no security aspect, with quantum teleportation and quantum dense coding being spectacular examples. We have shown that entanglement can also enhance security in quantum cryptography ͓17͔.
We have considered a cryptographic scenario, called secret sharing, in which there is a single sender and there are two receivers. The security analysis was performed for the secret sharing protocols by calculating quantum bit error rate thresholds. Since we are considering a scenario where there are two information transmission channels ͑respectively, from the sender to the two receivers͒, the physically meaningful case is to consider two eavesdroppers who act on the two channels locally but may securely communicate between themselves classically to discuss about the measurement outcomes in their respective local attacks. This is exactly the case that we consider and have found the optimal eavesdropping attacks for the considered secret sharing protocols.
In the process we have been able to show that bound entangled states with positive partial transpose are not a useful resource for the eavesdropper couple. We have also found the parallel of the Csiszár-Körner criterion for security in ͑single-receiver͒ cryptography in the distributed-receiver case and usefulness of the protocols in the presence of a depolarizing environment.
